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On 12 and 13 September 1985, the University of Antwerp held its third inter- 
national conference on ‘Health and Economics’. The organizing committee had 
chosen the economic incentive structure operating in health care as the central 
theme and invited a number of distinguished speakers from several countries to 
address this topic from different points of view. The main purpose was to examine 
the experiences abroad in order to derive conclusions for Belgian health care pol- 
icy. In spite of the large diversity of health care systems and incentive structures 
in the various countries, some consensus did emerge on how actual outcomes in 
terms of efficiency and equity could be brought nearer to the desired outcomes. 
But before we try to formulate the most important implications for health policy 
makers, we will first give an overview of the papers that were presented. They are 
all published elsewhere in this issue. 
1. In search of an optimal incentive structure 
The general theme of the conference was subdivided into four sessions contain- 
ing three contributions each. The first session was devoted to the incentives in dif- 
ferent health care systems in general, while the other three sessions concentrated 
on the incentives faced by each of the different parties involved in the health care 
market: providers (both physicians and hospital managers), consumers, and in- 
surers . 
Evans reports on the North American post-war experience by contrasting the 
performance of Canada and the United States in containing health care costs. His 
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main message is that universal comprehensive coverage through public insurance, 
while preserving private provision on a fee-for-service basis, is capable of con- 
trolling costs, apparently without affecting health outcomes. The puzzling thing 
about ‘the world’s most successful system for cost restraint’ seems to be, at least 
to us Europeans, why the Canadian provincial governments are doing such a good 
job in using their monopoly purchasing power over providers. As such, they seem 
to act fairly effectively as a collective agency for consumers/citizens’ interests. Eu- 
ropean experiences with’ similar public agencies attempting to exercise a counter- 
vailing power have not always been so successful. According to Evans, the answer 
to this problem is to be sought in a political theory of incentives facing groups of 
people rather than in the application of standard neoclassical economic theory to 
the behavior of individuals with respect to health care. 
This political market for health policy is precisely the focus of attention in Rut- 
ten’s contribution. His picture of governmental health care intervention in some 
Western European countries is quite gloomy. By means of examples taken from 
different countries with public insurance but private provision of health care, he 
argues that it should not be taken for granted that collective decision making is in 
the interest of the consumer/citizen. In order to bring the incentives for the public 
insurance agencies more in line with the interests of their insured, Rutten advo- 
cates the introduction of more competitive elements between these agencies. That 
the issue of economic incentives cannot even be neglected in public provision sys- 
tems like the Eastern European national health services is illustrated clearly by 
Wlodarczyk in his description of the recent developments of the Polish NHS. Rec- 
ognition of this fact has led to rationalization reforms that include such features as 
motivational bonuses, free choice of physician, and patient co-payments. Thus far, 
however, the incentives seem to have had more to do with productivity rather than 
efficiency, and the experiments are too recent for comprehensive evaluation of their 
effects. 
The second session of the conference was devoted to incentives for cost-effec- 
tive physician behavior. Freund presents us the results of some alternative pay- 
ment arrangements which have been implemented in the United States public health 
care program Medicaid. The new strategy centers around the concept of ‘managed 
care’, which implies that the primary care physician becomes a ‘case manager’ who, 
to a certain extent, shares the financial risk of his patients’ utilization. The prelim- 
inary results indicate that the success of case management in terms of cost con- 
tainment is critically dependent on a remuneration system based on a degree of 
comprehensive capitation payment, which also includes specialty and hospital care. 
Both in the non-competitive situation, when county health authorities establish 
contracts with local practitioners, and in the competitive context, where privately 
organized primary care networks negotiate Medicaid capitation payments with the 
state, the financial risk-sharing feature is essential in order to alter service delivery 
patterns, but it does not seem to be enough. Adequate monitoring of utilization 
and expenditures also requires well developed management information systems. 
According to the preliminary evidence reported by Freund, the effectiveness of the 
case management concept depends not only on the re-arrangement of the financial 
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incentives to the physicians but also on the provision of diagnostic and cost infor- 
mation on which they have to base their decisions. 
The Dutch experience with hospital budgeting, implemented in 1983, provides 
another interesting case study. Groot describes the impact of the closed-end fi- 
nancing structure imposed by the government on the behavior of clinicians work- 
ing in general hospitals. Obviously, it has increased the need for extensive cost in- 
formation per service delivered, for a re-organization of medical departments into 
a more hierarchical structure, and for the introduction of peer review mechanisms. 
However, the tensions created by leaving the salaries of the specialists out ot the 
budget formula remains a significant problem that may be an obstacle to the 
emergence of more cost-effective practice patterns in the near future. 
In the third contribution to this session, Maynard explores the physician incen- 
tive systems operating in the English National Health Service. He argues that, al- 
though cost control is not the major problem in a state health care system, the mi- 
cro-incentive structure is poor, often even perverse, and therefore causes inefficient 
use of resources. Future reforms are advocated that are based on two features: 
budgets for practitioners and provider competition for consumers. The budget- 
holder could be the primary care provider, comparable to Freund’s case man- 
agers, or the District Health Authority contracting with competing public and pri- 
vate providers. However, it seems unlikely that this type of radical change in the 
NHS will be considered in the near future by the Thatcher Government, despite 
all the plans for reform. 
The third session was explicitly concerned with incentives for cost-effective be- 
havior in hospitals, as they are being experimented with in the U.S.A., the U.K., 
and Belgium. The overview given by Neuhauser of recent changes in the U.S. in 
monetary and non-monetary incentives operating at all levels of the health care 
delivery system leads to a number of conclusions, that were also put forward by 
other speakers. For instance, economic incentives alone will not by themselves in- 
crease hospital team efficiency. Management skills and appropriate information are 
necessary complements of such incentives. The introduction of the DRG hospital 
payment system for Medicare patients seems to be one example of reversal of in- 
centives that have produced dramatic changes in hospital costs and utilization. The 
use of diagnosis-related groups is also advocated by Wickings but for a different 
reason. In his view, global and clinical budgets are becoming effective means of 
cost control in the U.K. but do not address outcomes adequately. DRGs could be 
used as a tool for associating costs with outcome and quality measures. If con- 
structed carefully, the categorization could give health system managers informa- 
tion about which prices for treatments can be reduced without affecting quality 
standards but can also provide a warning when lower prices begin to be associated 
with worsening outcomes. 
The recent changes in the rules and incentives for Belgian hospitals are de- 
scribed by Marchand. As of 1986, the retrospective cost-based reimbursement has 
been changed into a prospective per diem rate payment based on inter-hospital cost 
comparisons. Although the enactment of this change looks promising because rev- 
enue and costs are disconnected, there are still shortcomings. Hospital managers 
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still have great difficulties in transferring the pressure on resources to the cost-gen- 
erating medical practitioners whose medical fees are not subject to the same rate 
setting procedure. Moreover, multiplication of diagnostic and other procedures may 
be done in an attempt to compensate for the loss in hospitalization revenue. Sev- 
eral elements of the rate setting process itself, like the separation of cost items, 
the computation of a ‘reference’ cost, and the revision of day quotas, need further 
development in order to prevent undesirable distortions towards inefficient re- 
source allocations. 
In the final session the focus was on how the economic incentives to consumers 
and health insurance agencies could be improved. In his survey of the major de- 
velopments after what he calls the ‘Open-Ended Era’, Enthoven explains how the 
‘Market Competition Era’ has emerged in the United States health care economy. 
In his view, the fast growth of several types of Competitive Medical Plans will con- 
tinue in the near future and eventually result in a medical care system based only 
on these types of comprehensive health care financing and delivery organizations. 
In order to remedy the remaining problems of unfair competition and risk selec- 
tion, some regulation is advocated along the lines as proposed earlier in his Con- 
sumer Choice Health Plan. Otherwise, the radical increase in efficiency could ag- 
gravate equity problems. 
The ideas of Enthoven and others on regulated competition between provider- 
insurer organizations led van de Ven to develop a similar proposal for a National 
Health Insurance Act for The Netherlands. Convergence of public and private in- 
surance agencies towards a uniform health insurance system is suggested as a short- 
term strategy. Gradually, both types of insurers should develop into competing or- 
ganizations like the American CMPs. Although preconditions for system change 
seem favorable in The Netherlands, it is unclear whether pro-competitive regula- 
tory changes are more likely than the continuation of increased government plan- 
ning and regulation of health care. 
Finally, Zweifel examines the micro-economic effects of bonus systems, a type 
of consumer incentive that is not frequently used in health care. Although rebates 
for no claims can be considered as positive rather than negative economic incen- 
tives for consumers and may therefore be preferable to more traditional forms of 
cost-sharing, they have been shown to similarly restrain the demand for medical 
care much more among lower than among higher income groups. The notion of 
bonuses is certainly innovative in health care, but its importance should not be 
overestimated in view of the-fairly general consensus that seems to emerge from 
the other papers presented at the conference that incentives for providers and in- 
surers are more cost-effective than incentives for consumers. 
2. Lessons for Belgium 
What have we learned now from all this? What lessons can be drawn for a small 
country like Belgium with some 10 million people with extensive national health 
insurance coverage and one of the highest densities of providers, all remunerated 
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on a fee-for-service basis? During the last decade, one of the most popular cost- 
containment strategies used in this country was the introduction of small co-pay- 
ments for patients. Now if one thing has become clear from this conference, it is 
that economic incentives should not primarily be directed at fairly ignorant con- 
sumers. Rather, there seems to be a growing consensus for the viewpoint that the 
focus should be on incentives for providers and insurers. In all the incentive schemes 
discussed at this symposium be it case management, clinical budgets with or with- 
out DRGs, competitive medical plans, or prospective rate setting, the agency role 
of both providers and financial intermediaries (insurers or health authorities) is 
reinforced by putting them financially at risk and making them accountable for their 
decisions. If patients enter the picture they do not do so as users of medical care 
but as non-users or as shoppers for health insurance. This shift in emphasis is im- 
portant for future research efforts. Very little empirical knowledge is available on 
provider behavior and even less is known on how the ‘middlemen’ of this sector, 
the insurers and bureaucrats, would react to changing incentives. 
Putting the general principle of reinforcing the agency role into practice in the 
Belgian health care setting would require a redefinition of the role of the sickness 
funds. At present, they are no (longer) active insurers but predominantly payment 
offices acting as intermediaries between the state social security system, the pre- 
mium-payers and taxpayers, and the health care providers. Both premiums and fees 
are established at the national level, which leaves no room for price competition. 
Deficits are passed on to the national health insurance agency because the sickness 
funds are not accountable themselves. There seem to be two major ways in which 
the sickness fund’s role could be strenghthened by putting them financially at risk. 
The regulatory approach would imply that they get fixed budgets from the national 
social security budget for which they would have to cover their beneficiaries for a 
prespecified set of risks. But they should at the same time obtain more autonomy 
in negotiating payment contracts with individual providers. Whether this limited 
reform is enough to ensure cost-containment through improved efficiency is un- 
clear, but the Canadian experience with the provincial plans certainly suggests that 
it is feasible. 
The regulated-competition approach would require more profound changes in 
the system. Sickness funds would have to compete for clients with low premiums 
but would have the freedom to use their countervailing power to contract selec- 
tively with providers. In order to prevent preferred-risk selection, certain regula- 
tion would be necessary relating to open enrollment, minimum benefit packages, 
and supply of information. Distributional goals would be pursued through other 
means than the insurance system, e.g. through a tax and subsidy program. Nobody 
really knows yet whether such a plan will work because in the U.S. it has only 
been introduced in part (the competition is there already, the regulation is not) 
and in The Netherlands, at present, it only works in the mind of its proponents. 
Whichever way is chosen, it would always imply a strengthening of the role of 
the sickness funds from passive executors to active, competitive insurers. It is most 
likely that this view will be contested, both by the providers who do not like the 
prospect of dealing with powerful sickness funds, but perhaps also by the sickness 
114 
funds themselves, which do not seem in favor of too much change. Perhaps Milton 
Friedman’s law of bureaucratic inertia explains why: every large bureaucracy, gov- 
ernment or private, is convinced that the way it conducts its affairs is the only way 
that they can be conducted. 
